Steps towards denuclearization of DPRK Yosuke NAOI



Director, Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security



Japan Atomic Energy Agency

The International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy,
Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security

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Cooperation with Russia on Disposition of Weapon Plutonium

Background of excess weapon plutonium

After the end of the Cold War, a large amount of excess weapon plutonium (Pu) occurred with the development of nuclear disarmament negotiations between United States and Russia. Its diversion and proliferation risks became a serious concern.

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Reduction in the number of strategic nuclear warheads of Russia During the Cold War \Rightarrow 45,000 (max, estimated) 
START - I \Rightarrow up to 6,000* * Deployed number only 
START - II \Rightarrow up to 3,500* 
SORT \Rightarrow up to 2,200*
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United States and Russia agreed to dispose of excess weapon Pu in a bilateral setting.

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09/2000
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Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA):

Both sides agreed to dispose of 34 tons of Pu.

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11/2007
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
Joint statement: Both sides agreed to dispose of Pu by irradiating MOX fuels in the fast reactor (BN-600).

As of 2018, the progress on PMDA was suspended.

JAEA's cooperation on Vibropack MOX fuel fabrication


Technical cooperation by JAEA

JAEA provided Russia with technical assistance for realizing the Vibropack (Vi-pac) option. The option was to fabricate MOX fuels from weapon Pu by using vibro-packing technology in order to irradiate them in Russian fast reactor (BN-600). The disposition of 20 kg weapon Pu contributed to disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.



DPRK's Nuclear Program and Denuclearization Process

Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle



Nuclear Weapons Lifecycle Confidence Building through Cooperative Initiatives

DPRK's Nuclear Program


Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center

Uranium enrichment facility

Nuclear fuel rod fabrication plant (Installed machineries and its materials were removed in 2007.)

5 MWe graphite moderated reactor

Radiochemical research facility



Technical Process of Denuclearization

- 1 Disablement of nuclear test site
- 2 Disposal/removal of nuclear weapon
- **3 Dismantlement/disablement of nuclear weapon fabrication facility**
- 4 Disposal/removal of weapon usable material (Pu, HEU)
- ⑤ Dismantlement/disablement of facilities to produce weapon usable materials (uranium enrichment, reprocessing, nuclear reactor)
- **6 Disposal/removal of nuclear source materials**

Reduction in reliability and production capacity of nuclear weapon

Level of denuclearization

Longer time to acquire nuclear weapon

High

OW

Human resources, technical know-hows, procurement routes